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711 
Facebook and the Future of Fair Housing Online 
Introduction 
Facebook, the behemoth social media company founded in 2004, is no 
stranger to criticism in pursuit of its mission “to give people the power to 
build community and bring the world closer together.”
1
 Facebook’s critics 
have variously attacked its stance on privacy,
2
 retention of member 
information,
3
 and its role in proliferating false news,
4
 among a host of 
other issues.
5
 Amidst the hail of allegations against Facebook, the claim 
that Facebook’s advertising platform violates the Fair Housing Act has 
some powerful backers in the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development and the Justice Department.
6
 This Note focuses on the 
National Fair Housing Alliance’s (NFHA) suit against Facebook as an 
exemplar for understanding the current state of law governing housing 
discrimination online. Although Facebook and the NFHA ultimately 
reached a settlement agreement,
7
 the facts alleged in NFHA’s suit reify 
the larger issue of how to effectively and pragmatically effectuate 
potentially conflicting legislative goals (specifically the goals of the Fair 
Housing Act (FHA) and the Communications Decency Act (CDA)).
8
 
                                                                                                             
 1. FAQs: What Is Facebook’s Mission Statement?, FACEBOOK: INVESTOR REL., 
https://investor.fb.com/resources/default.aspx (last visited Dec. 10, 2019).  
 2. Geoff Duncan, Open Letter Urges Facebook to Strengthen Privacy, DIGITAL 
TRENDS (June 17, 2010, 9:28 AM PST), https://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/open-
letter-urges-facebook-to-strengthen-privacy/. 
 3. Maria Aspan, How Sticky Is Membership on Facebook? Just Try Breaking Free, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/11/technology/11facebook. 
html. 
 4. Hillary Clinton Says Facebook ‘Must Prevent Fake News from Creating a New 
Reality’, TELEGRAPH (June 1, 2017, 4:21 AM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/ 
2017/05/31/hillary-clinton-says-facebook-must-prevent-fake-news-creating/. 
 5. Alyssa Newcomb, A Timeline of Facebook’s Privacy Issues—and Its Responses, 
NBC NEWS (Mar. 24, 2018, 6:02 AM CDT), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/ 
timeline-facebook-s-privacy-issues-its-responses-n859651. 
 6. Brakkton Booker, HUD Hits Facebook for Allowing Housing Discrimination, NPR 
(Aug. 19, 2018, 7:42 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/19/640002304/hud-hits-
facebook-for-allowing-housing-discrimination (citing a HUD complaint against Facebook 
and the Justice Department’s filing of a statement of interest in the National Fair Housing 
Alliance’s suit against Facebook). 
 7. Facebook Settlement: Civil Rights Advocates Settle Lawsuit with Facebook: 
Transforms Facebook’s Platform Impacting Millions of Users, NAT’L FAIR HOUSING 
ALLIANCE, https://nationalfairhousing.org/facebook-settlement/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2019). 
 8. Even though Facebook and the NFHA have settled their dispute, the issues 
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This Note will analyze the questions presented in the NFHA case 
against Facebook in three parts. Part I analyzes the apparent statutory 
conflict between the provisions of the FHA and the CDA and the policy 
goals driving both enactments. Part II discusses CDA immunity in other 
contexts and the only two circuit court cases that specifically address the 
tension between the CDA and the FHA. Both cases are instructive as 
starting points for adjudicating housing discrimination claims in the 
digital context, though neither entails the level of sophistication alleged in 
NFHA’s complaint. Finally, Part III applies existing case law to the 
NFHA complaint and argues that reinvigorating the good faith language 
of the CDA and using modern tools to ensure compliance with the FHA 
will create a legal climate in which the purposes of both statutes may be 
better fulfilled. 
I. The Building Blocks of Online Housing Discrimination 
A. The Fair Housing Act 
The Fair Housing Act, enacted in 1968, aimed to “replace America’s 
segregated residential landscape with ‘truly integrated and balanced living 
patterns.’”
9
 The FHA bares its teeth in § 3604, which prohibits the 
following: discriminatory rejections of potential buyers or renters;
10
 
discrimination in terms or conditions of renting and provision of services 
to buyers or renters;
11
 discrimination in housing advertisements based on 
                                                                                                             
discussed in this Note are still pressing for several reasons. First, Facebook has previously 
made hollow proclamations that it would stop discriminatory housing ads. Julia Angwin, 
Ariana Tobin & Madeleine Varner, Facebook (Still) Letting Housing Advertisers Exclude 
Users by Race, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 21, 2017, 1:23 PM EST), https://www.propublica.org/ 
article/facebook-advertising-discrimination-housing-race-sex-national-origin. Second, HUD 
charged Facebook with discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing Act which is 
unimpacted by the settlement agreement between the NFHA and Facebook. Charge of 
Discrimination, HUD v. Facebook, Inc., FHEO No. 01-18-0323-8 (HUD Mar. 28, 2019), 
https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/Main/documents/HUD_v_Facebook.pdf. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, there is a distinct financial incentive to use targeted advertising, 
which means that issues involving discriminatory targeted advertising are unlikely to 
dissipate. See HOWARD BEALES, NETWORK ADVERT. INITIATIVE, THE VALUE OF BEHAVIORAL 
TARGETING 1 (2010), https://www.networkadvertising.org/pdfs/Beales_NAI_Study.pdf. 
 9. Rigel C. Oliveri, Discriminatory Housing Advertisements On-Line: Lessons from 
Craigslist, 43 IND. L. REV. 1125, 1129 (2010) (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968) 
(statement of Sen. Mondale)).  
 10. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012). 
 11. Id. § 3604(b). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss3/6





 and false representations that a property is not 
for rent or sale when such representation is made based on a protected 
characteristic of the prospective renter or buyer.
13
 Section 3604(c) is the 
basis of the complaint against Facebook, as it makes it unlawful 
[t]o make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed or 
published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect 
to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, 
limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, 
handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to 
make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination.
14
 




In United States v. Hunter, the Fourth Circuit became the first appellate 
court to consider § 3604(c) and the potential liability not only for those 
creating discriminatory advertisements but also for publishers of 
discriminatory advertisements.
16
 The court rejected the claim that an ad 
for a “white home” was beyond the FHA’s reach and instead held that 
“discriminatory classified advertisements in newspapers was precisely 
one of the evils the Act was designed to correct.”
17
 
Courts have also interpreted the breadth of § 3604(c)’s prohibition 
expansively in the context of traditional print media.
18
 In Ragin v. New 
York Times Co., the Second Circuit considered whether the district court 
properly denied the New York Times’ motion to dismiss a complaint 
alleging that the Times’ “real estate advertisements ‘featur[ed] thousands 
of human models of whom virtually none were black,’ and that the few 
blacks depicted rarely represented potential home buyers or renters,” 
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
19
 In affirming the denial, 
the Second Circuit held that § 3604(c) is “violated if an ad for housing 
suggests to an ordinary reader that a particular race is preferred or 
                                                                                                             
 12. Id. § 3604(c). 
 13. Id. § 3604(d). 
 14. Id. § 3604(c). 
 15. See Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999–1000 (2d Cir. 1991); United States 
v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 210 (4th Cir. 1972). 
 16. See Hunter, 459 F.2d at 209. 
 17. Id. at 209, 211.  
 18. See Ragin, 923 F.2d at 999–1000. 
 19. Id. at 998 (quoting the complaint).  
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dispreferred for the housing in question.”
20
 The court rejected the 
“intolerably narrow” reading of the statute the Times proffered, which 
would have limited the prohibition to “the most provocative and offensive 
expressions of racism or . . . outright refusal to sell or rent to persons of a 
particular race.”
21
 Instead, the court looked at the “broad language” in § 
3604(c) to hold that “the word ‘preference’ . . . describe[s] any ad that 
would discourage an ordinary reader of a particular race from answering 
it.”
22
 This expansive interpretation of § 3604(c)’s prohibition and the 
accompanying potential for liability largely led to the disappearance of 




B. The Communications Decency Act 
In 1995, the New York Supreme Court issued a decision
24
 that, in part, 
sparked Congress’s urgency in passing the Communications Decency 
Act.
25
 A securities investment banking firm alleged that Prodigy Services, 
a computer network provider that hosted the “Money Talk” bulletin 
board, which was “allegedly the leading and most widely read financial 
computer bulletin board in the United States,” was liable as a publisher 
for libelous statements made by third-party posters.
26
 Because Prodigy 
issued statements about how it sought to control the content on its bulletin 
boards, provided guidelines for permissible content, and ran automatic 
screening software, the court concluded that Prodigy was “a publisher 
rather than a distributor.”
27
 In essence, the court applied the model of 
                                                                                                             
 20. Id. at 999.  
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. at 999–1000.  
 23. Oliveri, supra note 9, at 1143 (“Thus, after the early 1970s discriminatory housing 
ads largely vanished.”) (citing 17 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 394 (2010)). 
 24. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., Index No. 031063/94, 23 Media 
L. Rep. (BNA) 1794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), 1995 WL 323710. 
 25. Julie Hsia, Note, Twitter Trouble: The Communications Decency Act in Inaction, 
2017 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 399, 408. (noting that Stratton Oakmont and Cubby, Inc. v. 
CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), together brought about the urgency to 
create the Act). 
 26. Stratton Oakmont, 23 Media L. Rep. at 1795, 1995 WL 323710, at *1. 
 27. Id. at 1797, 1995 WL 323710, at *4. “[O]ne who repeats or otherwise republishes a 
libel is subject to liability as if he had originally published it. In contrast, distributors . . . 
may be liable for defamatory statements of others only if they knew or had reason to know 
of the defamatory statement at issue.” Id. at 1796, 1995 WL 323710, at *3 (citations 
omitted). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss3/6
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liability used in the traditional media context to an internet bulletin and 
held that “PRODIGY’s conscious choice, to gain the benefits of editorial 
control, has opened it up to a greater liability than . . . other computer 
networks that make no such choice.”
28
 
The decision in Stratton Oakmont
29
 immediately stirred resistance in 
Congress because it created a perverse incentive for website operators to 
exercise less editorial control to avoid publisher liability for third-party 
content.
30
 In 1996, Congress passed the Communications Decency Act, 
which aimed to “promote the continued development of the Internet 
and . . . preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently 
exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered 
by Federal or State regulation.”
31
 The Act had the dual purpose of 
overruling the decision in Stratton Oakmont and enlisting internet service 
providers (ISPs) in the battle against what Congress perceived to be 
obscene material proliferating on the nascent internet.
32
 Ultimately, a 
federal district court enjoined most of the Act one week after its 
enactment
33




Section 230(c) of the Communications Decency Act survived the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Reno unscathed and has since become a 
cornerstone for website operator immunity in a variety of contexts.
35
 The 
                                                                                                             
 28. Id. at 1798, 1995 WL 323710, at *5.  
 29. Martin Scorsese brought the story of this firm and its demise to life in the 2013 film 
The Wolf of Wall Street. See Eriq Gardner, Paramount Defeats ‘Wolf of Wall Street’ Libel 
Suit from Stratton Oakmont Alum, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Dec. 13, 2018, 1:55 PM PT), 
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/paramount-defeats-wolf-wall-street-libel-suit-
stratton-oakmont-alum-1169108.  
 30. See Matthew Schruers, Note, The History and Economics of ISP Liability for Third 
Party Content, 88 VA. L. REV. 205, 212–13 (2002).  
 31. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)–(2) (2018).  
 32. Schruers, supra note 30, at 213; see also Scope, Exclusions and Legislative Purpose, 
4 E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW 37.05[1][A] (2019 update), ECOMMINTLAW 
37.05[1][A] (Westlaw) (“Subpart 230(c)(1) was intended to overrule the Stratton Oakmont 
decision.”). 
 33. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
 34. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (“[T]wo statutory provisions enacted to 
protect minors from ‘indecent’ and ‘patently offensive’ communications on the Internet . . . 
[unconstitutionally] abridge[] ‘the freedom of speech’ protected by the First Amendment.”) 
(footnote omitted).  
 35. See, e.g., Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding social 
network immune from state negligence claim); Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 
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immunity provided under § 230(c) is twofold. First, § 230(c)(1) prohibits 
any “provider or user of an interactive computer service” from being 
“treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider.”
36
 Next, § 230(c)(2) essentially 
creates a “Good Samaritan” portion of the immunity provision by 
exempting “provider[s] or user[s] of an interactive computer service” 




The statute also defines two terms that have become critical in the 
jurisprudence surrounding CDA immunity: “interactive computer service 
[provider]” and “information content provider.”
38
 The CDA defines 
interactive computer service providers as any “information service, 
system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer 
access by multiple users to a computer server.”
39
 By contrast, the CDA 
defines information content providers as any “person or entity that is 
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of 
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive 
computer service.”
40
 Scholars have noted that the first portion of § 230 
seems to entail a robust immunity when read alone, but when read in 
context, the statutory immunity is more limited in its scope.
41
 
In a decision interpreting § 230 just over one year after its enactment, 
the Fourth Circuit held that it granted “broad immunity” to service 
providers.
42
 The question of how this broad immunity interacted with the 
                                                                                                             
468 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding AOL immune from state tort law claim); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, 
& Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 984 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding defendant immune 
from state law claims for defamation and negligence). 
 36. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2018).  
 37. Id. § 230(c)(2)(A). 
 38. Id. § 230(f)(2), (3). 
 39. Id. § 230(f)(2). 
 40. Id. § 230(f)(3). 
 41. See Oliveri, supra note 9, at 1140.  
 42. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997). Here an unknown 
person posted messages to an AOL bulletin board on April 25 and 26, 1995, advertising 
shirts mocking the Oklahoma City bombing (which occurred on April 19, 1995) and listed 
the plaintiff’s phone number urging users to call. Id. at 329. As a result of these posts and a 
subsequent Oklahoma City radio station broadcast about the posts, the plaintiff received a 
deluge of angry calls and death threats. Id. In upholding AOL’s immunity under the CDA, 
the court recognized the important interests of ensuring open communications on the internet 
and encouraging website operators to self-police without the threat of publisher liability 
hanging over their heads. Id. at 331. Accordingly, the court held that “Congress’ desire to 
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Fair Housing Act was left unanswered for over a decade, until the Seventh 
and Ninth Circuit Courts first addressed the potential conflict. 
II. Craigslist & Roommates – Two Circuits Consider the Conflict 
A. Craigslist: FHA Liability for Purely Third-Party Content 
Although some scholars noted the potential conflict between the FHA’s 
advertising provisions and § 230’s immunity,
43
 the issue was not 
considered at the circuit level until a pair of decisions by the Seventh and 
Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals in 2008.
44
 In Chicago Lawyers’ 
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., a public 
interest consortium alleged that Craigslist violated § 3604(c) of the FHA 
by permitting notices on its site that included statements such as “NO 
MINORITIES” and “No children.”
45
 Although the court expressed general 
support for the notion that “§ 230(c)(1) provides ‘broad immunity from 
liability for unlawful third-party content,’”
46
 it rejected the notion that § 
230(c) could “be understood as a general prohibition of civil liability for 
web-site operators and other online content hosts[.]”
47
  
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary 
judgment for Craigslist because the site could only be liable as a publisher 
under § 3604(c) of the FHA and § 230(c)(1) states that “an online 
information system must not ‘be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by’ someone else.”
48
 The court reasoned that § 
                                                                                                             
promote unfettered speech on the Internet must supersede conflicting common law causes of 
action.” Id. at 334.  
 43. Jennifer C. Chang, Note, In Search of Fair Housing in Cyberspace: The 
Implications of the Communications Decency Act for Fair Housing on the Internet, 55 STAN. 
L. REV. 969, 1011 (2002) (“This complete legislative silence [on the FHA/CDA conflict] 
suggests not only that [Congress] failed to realize that fair housing interests would be 
implicated at all in the passage of § 230, but that Congress did not intend for the fair 
advertising mandates to be abrogated.”). 
 44. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 
1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. 
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008).  
 45. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm., 519 F.3d at 668.  
 46. Id. at 669 (citing Zeran, 129 F.3d at 327; Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online, 
Inc., 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000); Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 
2003); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003); Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. 
Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007)).  
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 671 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)).  
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230(c)(1)’s prohibition on liability need not mention the FHA because “a 
law’s scope often differs from its genesis.”
49
 The impetus for § 
230(c)(1)’s immunity was the Stratton Oakmont decision, in which the 
court held “an information content provider liable, as a publisher, because 
it had exercised some selectivity with respect to the sexually oriented 
material it would host for customers.”
50
 Even so, the issue for the court 
was not the particular impetus that led Congress to enact the CDA, but 
rather the language of the statute itself which “covers ads for housing, . . . 
and everything else that third parties may post on a web site.”
51
 Further, 
the court noted that “[n]othing in the service craigslist offers induces 
anyone to post any particular listing or express a preference for 
discrimination.”
52
 The court concluded that the plaintiffs could pursue a 
claim against the third-party creators of the discriminatory 
advertisements, but they could not “sue the messenger just because the 




B. Roommates.com: Creating Discrimination Online 
The Ninth Circuit addressed the same statutory tension in Fair Housing 
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC.
54
 The 
defendant, Roommates.com, LLC (“Roommate”),
55
 operated a website 
that matched prospective roommates.
56
 Roommate required users to create 
profiles before using the website
57
 and also required that they disclose 
their sex, sexual orientation, and whether the user would be moving in 
with children.
58
 Roommate also offered an optional “Additional 
                                                                                                             
 49. Id. 
 50. Id.; see also Oliveri, supra note 9 at 1139–40 (“The ruling in Prodigy troubled 
lawmakers, who wanted to facilitate the free flow of ideas on the Internet but also wished to 
encourage website operators to screen and filter offensive content, particularly pornographic 
or indecent material. Thus, a provision entitled ‘“good Samaritan” blocking and screening of 
offensive material’ was added to the CDA[.]”) (footnote omitted).  
 51. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm., 519 F.3d at 671. 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. at 672.  
 54. 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 55. Id. at 1161 n.2 (“For unknown reasons, the company goes by the singular name 
‘Roommate.com, LLC’ but pluralizes its website’s URL, www.roommates.com.”).  
 56. Id. at 1161.  
 57. Id.  
 58. Id.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss3/6
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Comments” section, which encouraged users to describe themselves and 
what they were looking for in a prospective roommate.
59
 The Fair 
Housing Councils of the San Fernando Valley and San Diego 
(“Councils”) filed suit, alleging that Roommate violated the Fair Housing 
Act by requiring disclosure of protected characteristics, using this 
information to develop profile pages for each user, and therefore 
perpetuating discrimination.
60
 Further, the Councils “argue[d] that 
Roommate should be held liable for the discriminatory statements 
displayed in the ‘Additional Comments’ section of the profile pages.”
61
 
A majority of the en banc Ninth Circuit held that, under the CDA, 
Roommate was not immune from liability for requiring disclosure of 
protected characteristics and publishing profiles based on those 
characteristics, but it was immune from liability for discriminatory 
statements in the “Additional Comments” section.
62
 In holding that 
Roommate was not immune as to user profile registration and information 
disclosure, the court focused on the fine line between being a purely 
“interactive computer service provider” as opposed to an “information 
content provider.”
63
 The court interpreted CDA immunity as applying 
only to interactive computer service providers insofar as they are not 
“‘responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of’ the 
offending content.”
64
 Since a website can both “passively display[] 
content that is created entirely by third parties,” as well as create content 
itself, “a website may be immune from liability for some of the content it 
displays to the public but be subject to liability for other content.”
65
 
Addressing the required questionnaire, the court viewed Roommate as 
“undoubtedly the ‘information content provider’” and held that it could 
not “claim . . . immunity for posting [the questions] on its website, or for 
forcing subscribers to answer them as a condition of using its services.”
66
 
While the court left the issue of whether the questions violated the FHA 
or warranted First Amendment protection for remand, the court roundly 
rejected the notion that the questions existing online entitled Roommate to 
                                                                                                             
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. at 1164–65.  
 61. Id. at 1173.  
 62. Id. at 1164, 1172, 1174–75. 
 63. Id. at 1162.  
 64. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3)). 
 65. Id. at 1162–63 (footnote omitted).  
 66. Id. at 1164. 
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immunity under the CDA.
67
 The court reasoned that “asking questions 
certainly can violate the Fair Housing Act . . . in the physical world . . . 
[and such questions] don’t magically become lawful when asked 
electronically online.”
68
 Thus, Roommate was not immune under the CDA 
because it “induc[ed] third parties to express illegal preferences.”
69
 
The second issue—Roommate’s use of user responses to build user 
profiles and match prospective roommates—keyed on the notion of what 
it means for an interactive computer service to create or develop the 
information in whole or in part.
70
 While the majority recognized that 
reading the term “develop” too “broadly would defeat the purposes of 
section 230 by swallowing up every bit of the immunity that the section 
otherwise provides,” it also rejected the notion that an information content 
provider must be the exclusive developer of discriminatory content in 
order to remove CDA immunity.
71
 With this tension between under- and 
over-inclusivity in mind, the court interpreted the term “development” as 
“referring not merely to augmenting the content generally, but to 
materially contributing to its alleged unlawfulness.”
72
 In light of this 
definition, the court viewed Roommate’s role in the development of the 
allegedly unlawful content as “direct and palpable.”
73
 Since Roommate 
designed its website “to force subscribers to divulge protected 
characteristics . . . and to match . . . based on criteria that appear to be 
                                                                                                             
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 69. Id. at 1165. 
 70. Id. at 1162 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3)). 
 71. Id. at 1167. 
 72. Id. at 1167–68. 
 73. Id. at 1169. The court summarized Roommate’s role in actively developing 
discriminatory content as follows: 
Roommate designed its search and email systems to limit the listings available 
to subscribers based on sex, sexual orientation and presence of children. 
Roommate selected the criteria used to hide listings, and Councils allege that 
the act of hiding certain listings is itself unlawful under the Fair Housing Act, 
which prohibits brokers from steering clients in accordance with discriminatory 
preferences. We need not decide the merits of Councils’ claim to hold that 
Roommate is sufficiently involved with the design and operation of the search 
and email systems—which are engineered to limit access to housing on the 
basis of the protected characteristics elicited by the registration process—so as 
to forfeit any immunity to which it was otherwise entitled under section 230. 
Id. at 1169–70 (footnotes omitted)). 
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2020]       NOTES 721 
 
 




The court further emphasized the difference between those activities 
that enjoy CDA immunity and those that do not by holding that 
Roommate enjoyed immunity for the “Additional Comments” section.
75
 
Effectively, Roommate provided “a blank text box, in which [users could] 
type as much or as little” as they pleased.
76
 The court reasoned that such 
blank entry forms are “precisely the kind of situation for which section 
230 was designed to provide immunity,” because such content “comes 
entirely from subscribers and is passively displayed by Roommate.”
77
 
Unlike the questionnaire and profile matching issues, Roommate’s 
“Additional Comments” section “does not tell subscribers what kind of 
information they should or must include.”
78
 Ultimately, the court 
concluded that Congress did not pass § 230 
to prevent the enforcement of all laws online; rather, it sought 
to encourage interactive computer services that provide users 
neutral tools to post content online to police that content 
without fear that through their ‘good samaritan . . . screening of 
offensive material,’ they would become liable for every single 
message posted by third parties on their website.
79
 
The decisions in Craigslist and Roommates.com elucidate a few critical 
ideas courts have used in resolving the potential conflict between the FHA 
and CDA. First, websites enjoy a presumption of immunity for third-party 
content, and purely neutral tools (open text boxes or blank-entry search 
engines, for example) will generally enjoy immunity under the CDA as 
the statute relates to the FHA. Second, to overcome this presumption of 
immunity, plaintiffs must show that the website operator participates in 
creating or developing the content at issue—as the Ninth Circuit defines 
it, “materially contributing to its alleged unlawfulness.”
80
 Finally, if a 
website operator takes steps to induce or require users to disclose 
protected characteristics and subsequently operationalizes that 
                                                                                                             
 74. Id. at 1172, 1175. 
 75. Id. at 1174.  
 76. Id. at 1173.  
 77. Id. at 1174. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. at 1175 (citation omitted). 
 80. Id. at 1168. 
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information, the website operator may thereby become a content provider 
and forfeit its immunity. 
III. Facebook and the Future of Fair Housing Online 
The preceding analysis of the Fair Housing Act, the Communications 
Decency Act, and the case law interpreting the conflict between the two, 
exposes two critical issues in the NFHA complaint against Facebook. The 
first, and perhaps more basic, issue is whether Facebook’s “Pre-Populated 
List[,]” which allegedly allows “landlords and real estate agents [to] target 
certain persons or groups for, and exclude other persons or groups from, 
receiving housing ads,” constitutes a sufficient act of creation or 
development so as to overcome Facebook’s immunity under the CDA.
81
 
The second, and more difficult, issue is whether Facebook participated in 
the development of discriminatory housing advertisements and vitiated its 
immunity by “extract[ing] data from its users’ online behavior . . . and 
us[ing] algorithms designed to sort that data, process it, and repackage it 
to group potential customers into . . . categories for advertisers to choose 
from when targeting their ads.”
82
  
Essentially, the latter issue concerns whether Facebook is immune 
when it allows advertisers to exclude certain users based on their interest 
in proxy categories such as “Telemundo” or “Interest in Disabled Parking 
Permit.”
83
 More generally, this issue will only grow as digital 
advertisement continues to grow in importance, as evidenced by digital 




A. Facebook’s Reply and Issues of Law 
In its reply to the NFHA complaint about discriminatory housing 
advertisements, Facebook argues that its activities are distinct from those 
of the defendant in Roommates.com in that Roommate offered “an online 
housing service used by only housing advertisers, whereas Facebook 
offers a generic online advertising service used by all advertisers placing 
                                                                                                             
 81. First Amended Complaint at 34, Nat’l Fair Hous. All. et al. v. Facebook, Inc., No. 
1:18-cv-02689-JGK (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 82. Id. at 13. 
 83. Id. at 34. 
 84. Press Release, MAGNA, MAGNA Advertising Forecasts (Fall Update – Executive 
Summary) at 3 (Sept. 20, 2018), https://magnaglobal.com/magna-advertising-forecasts-fall-
update-executive-summary. 
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ads for all types of products, services and information.”
85
 This initial 
distinction as to the nature of the websites seems dubious at best. In the 
context of traditional media, courts would not treat a newspaper 
publishing a discriminatory housing ad among ads for “all types of 
products, services and information” differently from a publication 
dedicated exclusively to publishing housing advertisements.
86
  
Ultimately, Facebook argues that “there is nothing unlawful under the 
FHA . . . about Facebook requiring users to identify their sex at signup or 
using that information to create tools that allow, but do not require, all 
advertisers to target ads for all types of products, services and 
information.”
87
 As to the “‘pre-populated list’ of targeting options,” 
Facebook flatly denies that discriminatory options are readily available.
88
 
Instead, Facebook argues that these tools are only an “option” accessed 
“through searches using a blank search box or by browsing multi-level 
menus.”
89
 With the required disclosures at sign-up and use of the 
information disclosed, Facebook argues that “there is no publication of a 
discriminatory housing ad on Facebook unless an advertiser decides to (1) 
create a housing ad and (2) target it in a discriminatory manner.”
90
 Such a 
system “is the definition of a ‘neutral tool’ under the CDA and 
establishes, under well-settled precedent, that Facebook is not an 
‘information content provider’ in this case.”
91
 
As to this second line of argument, it is likely that Facebook is correct 
under current precedent. To dispel the dissent’s concerns about the 
holding in Roommates.com, the majority opinion provided some examples 
of activity that would “not amount to ‘development’ under section 230.”
92
 
The court’s list of examples included “ordinary search engine[s used] to 
query for a ‘white roommate,’ . . . [or] a housing website that allows users 
to specify whether they will or will not receive emails by means of user-
                                                                                                             
 85. Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Transfer Venue, or 
Alternatively to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint at 9, Nat‘l Fair Hous. All. v. 
Facebook, Inc., No. 1:18-cv-02689-JGK (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 86. See Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999–1000 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 87. Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Transfer Venue, or 
Alternatively to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, supra note 85, at 11. 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. (citation omitted). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. (citing Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, 306 F. Supp. 3d 579, 589–90 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)).  
 92. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 
1157, 1169 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
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 If Facebook’s factual allegations are true, then it is 
likely immune under current jurisprudence because it does nothing to 
require or encourage discriminatory housing advertisements. In 
Roommates.com, it was critical to the court’s decision that the website 
operator required disclosure and then matched users based on this 
disclosure. By contrast, nothing Facebook has done could be viewed as 
requiring discrimination as a functional part of its platform. 
Discriminatory housing advertisements within its system are 
discriminatory only insofar as a third-party chooses to make them so. 
Under the current legal framework, it is likely Facebook would succeed 




B. Looking Beyond the Facebook Complaint 
Although Facebook and the NFHA have settled their dispute, the 
complaint exposes some of the limitations of the current framework for 
analyzing the conflict between the Fair Housing Act and the 
Communications Decency Act and provides an opportunity for reflection 
on potential improvements. This Note offers two suggestions to address 
the shortcomings of the statute. The first suggestion is backward-looking. 
Although the provisions of § 230 have been interpreted generally as 
providing “broad immunity from liability for unlawful third-party 
content,” such an interpretation ignores the context within which the CDA 
was enacted and the text of the statute itself.
95
 The second suggestion is 
forward-looking. If Facebook’s, or any other website’s, advertising 
algorithms are truly functioning as a “neutral tool,” how are agencies 
tasked with enforcement of applicable federal regulations (or other 
interested parties) to know? Recent scholarship has underscored the 
                                                                                                             
 93. Id.; see also Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, 
Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671–72 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Nothing in the service craigslist offers induces 
anyone to post any particular listing or express a preference for discrimination . . . . If 
craigslist ‘causes’ the discriminatory notices, then so do phone companies and courier 
services (and, for that matter, the firms that make the computers and software that owners 
use to post their notices online), yet no one could think that Microsoft and Dell are liable for 
‘causing’ discriminatory advertisements.”). 
 94. See supra note 7.  
 95. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm., 519 F.3d at 669–70 (citing Zeran, 129 F.3d at 327; Ben Ezra, 
Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000); Green v. Am. Online 
(AOL), 318 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 2003); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003); 
Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007)).  
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importance of understanding “technical accountability [as] a necessary 
step to enable political accountability.”
96
 These two avenues are in no way 
fool-proof or complete solutions to the issue of fair housing online; 
however, they represent realistic means through which the goal of ending 
discriminatory housing advertisements may be effectuated, with due 
respect for the past and appropriate acknowledgment of the future. 
The first avenue to resolving the conflict between the CDA and the 
FHA is to recognize, as the Seventh Circuit has, that “§ 230(c) as a whole 
cannot be understood as a general prohibition of civil liability for web-site 
operators.”
97
 The court understood that if § 230 immunity is divorced 
from its origins and title (“Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and 
screening of offensive material”),
98
 then the logical conclusion is that 
websites lack motivation to monitor the material they host.
99
 Instead, the 
immunity afforded under § 230(c) must be understood according to its 
language that requires “action[s] voluntarily taken in good faith.”
100
 As 
the Seventh Circuit persuasively argued in Craigslist, immunity from civil 
liability under the CDA is earned, not granted regardless of whether the 
website operator takes action.
101
 To effectively pursue the goals of the 
Fair Housing Act online, courts should require good faith actions by 
                                                                                                             
 96. Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms and the 
Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 11 (2017). 
 97. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm., 519 F.3d at 669. 
 98. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2018). 
 99. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm., 519 F.3d at 669–70 (“If this reading is sound, then § 230(c) 
as a whole makes ISPs indifferent to the content of information they host or transmit: 
whether they do (subsection (c)(2)) or do not (subsection (c)(1)) take precautions, there is no 
liability under either state or federal law. As precautions are costly, . . . ISPs may be 
expected to take the do-nothing option and enjoy immunity under § 230(c)(1). Yet § 
230(c)—which is, recall, part of the ‘Communications Decency Act’—bears the title 
‘Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive material’, hardly an 
apt description if its principal effect is to induce ISPs to do nothing about the distribution of 
indecent and offensive materials via their services.”) (quoting Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 
655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003)).  
 100. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).  
 101. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm., 519 F.3d at 669–70 (“Section 230(c)(2) tackles this problem 
[of potential liability for hosting pornographic pictures] not with a sword but with a safety 
net. A web host that does filter out offensive material is not liable to the censored customer. 
Removing the risk of civil liability may induce web hosts and other informational 
intermediaries to take more care to protect the privacy and sensibilities of third parties.”) 
(quoting Doe, 347 F.3d at 659) (alterations in original).  
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entities like Facebook when their tools are used to perpetuate 
discrimination. 
Policing discriminatory housing advertisements purely by pursuing 
claims against individual users is largely ineffective.
102
 The most 
straightforward and efficacious avenue is to “simply add[] the FHA to the 
list of exemptions already contained in the CDA.”
103
 While this would 
certainly be an effective modification, such an amendment is arguably 
unnecessary if courts follow the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of § 
230(c). In the present case, both the NFHA and Facebook could make 
effective arguments about whether Facebook has adequately operated as a 
Good Samaritan trying to screen discriminatory housing advertisements. 
In NFHA’s favor, it certainly seems contradictory that Facebook made 
public statements about addressing the issue while ProPublica’s reporting 
demonstrated that such statements do not reflect the reality of what users 
can do with the targeted advertising platform.
104
 However, Facebook 
could likely overcome such an argument by pointing to the neutral nature 
of the tools it provides and the repeated warnings it provides to 
advertisers about violating the FHA and similar laws.
105
  
The above analysis addresses many of the legal issues presented by 
NFHA’s suit against Facebook; however, the case against Facebook 
reveals an instance of the larger issue of effectively regulating behavior in 
a digital world with laws designed in a non-digital world. Ragin involved 
adjudicating whether a single advertisement violated the FHA.
106
 Stratton 
Oakmont, which partially prompted Congress to adopt the CDA, involved 
a website that was essentially a series of web-based bulletin boards with 
around two million users.
107
 Facebook, by contrast, boasts over two 
                                                                                                             
 102. Oliveri, supra note 9, at 1173. 
 103. Id. at 1174; see also Brent Skorup & Jennifer Huddleston, The Erosion of Publisher 
Liability in American Law, Section 230, and the Future of Online Curation, 72 OKLA. L. 
REV. 627, 653 (2020) (addressing the factors legislators must consider when imposing 
liability on online intermediaries for user-generated content).  
 104. See supra note 7. 
 105. See Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Transfer Venue, or 
Alternatively to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, supra note 85, at 9–10.  
 106. See supra notes 18–22 and accompanying text.  
 107. See supra notes 24–28 and accompanying text.  
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billion users and includes everything from group pages to messaging, 
advertising, personal profiles, business pages, and more.
108
  
The second avenue of effectively implementing the FHA and the CDA 
in an online world involves addressing a fundamental disconnect between 
legal and technical accountability.
109
 In the world of law, there is a deeply 
rooted notion that the builder of object X, which performs function Y, 
will know precisely what X will do and that another person with proper 
instructions could similarly determine what object X will do.
110
 Within the 
digital context, one might argue that if Facebook were forced to reveal the 
code (in lieu of plans) behind its targeted advertising system, one could 
readily determine whether Facebook contributes to online housing 
discrimination in any meaningful way. However, such an argument fails 
to recognize the unique nature of dynamic online systems in which the 
plethora of potential system interactions makes it so that “social science 




While the idea of “looking under the hood” of Facebook’s advertising 
platform is enticing, it would likely prove fruitless.
112
 Instead, two 
effective technical solutions would help bridge the gap between legal and 
technical accountability: a system of input filtration
113
 and an effective 
system of ex-post analysis.
114
 Input filtration would require that website 
operators use filtering software to halt the publication of potentially 
discriminatory housing advertisements briefly.
115
 Website operators could 
accomplish this filtering by showing the user a warning regarding the ad’s 
potentially discriminatory nature and submitting the advertisement for 
individualized review if the user chooses not to remove the language or 
adjust the targeting.
116
 This system would also support the website 
                                                                                                             
 108. Meira Gebel, In 15 Years Facebook Has Amassed 2.3 Billion Users—More Than 
Followers of Christianity, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 4, 2019, 12:29 PM), https://www.business 
insider.com/facebook-has-2-billion-plus-users-after-15-years-2019-2. 
 109. Desai & Kroll, supra note 96, at 7–8. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. at 10.  
 112. Id. at 34 (“[I]f the goal or dream is to test, for example, an online ad network, and 
see whether a specific outcome—like race or gender discrimination—will occur, there is no 
analysis that will always determine that.”).  
 113. Oliveri, supra note 9, at 1175. 
 114. Desai & Kroll, supra note 96, at 39.  
 115. Oliveri, supra note 9, at 1176. 
 116. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
728 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:711 
 
 
operator’s Good Samaritan immunity argument under the CDA because it 
would allow the operator to emphasize its removal efforts, the kind of 
actions Congress sought to protect in response to Stratton Oakmont. 
Ex-post analysis of software systems is a subject beyond the scope of 
this Note, but there are “technical tools including cryptographic 
commitments and zero-knowledge proofs to allow for an automated 
decision process to be used and at the same time ‘provide 
accountability.’”
117
 In essence, these are tools that allow observers to 
review whether a system performed according to its design. Given the 
limitless number of possible inputs inherent in dynamic online systems 
like Facebook, it is simply impossible to know every potential outcome 
before the systems are in operation or what exact process produced a 
given output.
118
 Consequently, the best approach in such systems is to 
design them with appropriate filtration systems, as discussed above, and 
use effective methods to verify that the system is functioning as instructed 
on the back end. While neither technical suggestion is without its faults, 
both represent meaningful steps towards effectuating the legislative goals 
underlying both the FHA and the CDA. 
IV. Conclusion 
Even though the NFHA complaint against Facebook has been settled, 
the parties’ filings bring two legitimate, competing societal interests into 
                                                                                                             
 117. Desai & Kroll, supra note 96, at 40 (footnotes omitted). “[A] cryptographic 
commitment ‘is the digital equivalent of a sealed document held by a third party or in a safe 
place.’” Id. at 40 n.203 (quoting Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. 
L. REV. 633, 655 (2016)). 
A zero-knowledge proof works as part of a cryptographic commitment. It 
“allows a decisionmaker . . . to prove that the decision policy that was actually 
used (or the particular decision reached in a certain case) has a certain property, 
but without having to reveal either how that property is known or what the 
decision policy actually is.” 
Id. at 40 n.204 (internal citations omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting Joshua A. Kroll et 
al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 668 (2016)). 
 118. Id. at 37 (“There are two common settings in which one tests software: white-box 
and black-box. In white-box settings, the analyst has access to the source code. . . . Black-
box settings, in which the analyst is restricted to only see the inputs and outputs of the 
system but not its internal operation, pose more problems. Some limitations apply in both 
settings. In either setting, there are two categories of analysis: static analysis, which 
examines the program’s structure or code without actually running it; and dynamic analysis, 
which runs the program and observes its behavior on certain inputs.”). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss3/6
2020]       NOTES 729 
 
 
sharp focus. On the one hand, an open and free internet has allowed for 
incredible economic growth—one of the principal purposes behind the 
Communications Decency Act. On the other hand, the Fair Housing Act’s 
purpose of ensuring equal access to housing is no less important today 
than it was in 1968. Accordingly, courts and legislatures should pursue an 
approach that balances these competing interests. 
The approach advocated herein—that website operators claiming CDA 
immunity should be required to show good faith regulatory efforts that are 
technically accountable
119
—appropriately balances these two goals. In the 
interest of fair housing, this approach prohibits website operators from 
merely providing “neutral” tools and claiming CDA immunity whenever a 
claim arises without reference to any standard. Instead, website operators 
would be required to show good faith efforts and verify those efforts. The 
goal of truly fair housing online will be most effectively pursued through 
jurisprudence that upholds the intent of the Fair Housing Act by 
appropriately applying the immunity afforded under the Communications 
Decency Act and implementing reasonable technical requirements to 
ensure dynamic online systems are functioning desirably.  
 
Jacob Parker Black 
                                                                                                             
 119. Meaning specifically, online dynamic systems generating reliable evidence to verify 
the system functions in the desired way. 
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